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"THE SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST IS OUR DOCTRINE":
HISTORY OR HISTRIONICS?
BY ROBERTC. BANNISTER

Whatever their differences American reformers of the late nineteenth century reached unusual agreement on one point. Opponents
of increased state action, they alleged, were engaged in a highly
dubious enterprise of wedding Darwinism to the virtues of classical
economics, thus trading illicitly on the prestige of the new science.
In Progress and Poverty (1879), Henry George charged that Malthusianism was now "buttressed" by the new science, and bemoaned
"a sort of hopeful fatalism, of which current literature is full." "The
final plea for any form of brutality in these days," wrote the Nationalist Edward Bellamy, "is that it tends to the survival of the fittest."
"The survival of the fittest is our doctrine," echoed the reformer
Henry Demarest Lloyd. "The representatives of science" noted the
sociologist Lester Ward more soberly, "stand boldly in the track of
current events." Ward acknowledged that appeals to "natural law"
antedated the Darwinian doctrines of "survival of the fittest" and
"natural selection." But, he added, "it cannot be denied that these
doctrines ... have greatly strengthened this habit of thought."'
This testimony is important for two reasons. Urging programs that
ranged from the Single Tax to socialism, these reformers were in common battle against theories of laissez-faire, individualism, and related
success mythologies that had bloomed during America's first stage of
industrialism. The charge that defenders of laissez-faire had misappropriated Darwinism was an important part of their struggle since
it usually prefaced a "correct" reading of evolution, the "reform Darwinism" that informed many socialist and neo-liberal proposals. Moreover, these same charges were widely quoted in historical accounts of
"social Darwinism" which appeared during the 1940's and 1950's, the
most important of which is Richard Hofstadter's Social Darwinism in
American Thought (1944). Darwinism-as embodied in the popular
catchwords "struggle for existence," "natural selection," and "survival
of the fittest," as well as in a general evolutionism-was, Hofstadter
'Henry George, Progress and Poverty (New York, 1942), 101, 480. Edward Bellamy, Edward Bellamy Speaks Again! (1937), 34. Lloyd, Man the Social Creator (New
York, 1906), 218-20. Lester F. Ward "Politico-Social Functions" [1881], Glimpses of
the Cosmos (6 vols., New York, 1913-18), II, 336; "Mind as a Social Factor" [1884],
ibid., III, 364. I wish to thank the American Council of Learned Societies for a Fellowship under which this study was begun.
377
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writes, "one of the great informing insights in . . . the history of the
conservative mind in America." The Darwinized conservatism against
which George and other reformers battled was real. Their attack upon
it was part of a struggle "to wrest Darwinism from the social Darwinists." From Hofstadter's study-and those of Curti, Goldman,
Fine and others-a post-New Deal generation learned that the "survival of the fittest," as Lloyd said, had indeed once been "our [America's] doctrine."2
Yet how reliable are such contemporary statements? What conservatives specifically were under indictment? These questions involve
not only the accuracy of eye-witness testimony, but bear upon a continuing controversy concerning the nature and extent of conservative
social Darwinism in the period before 1900. Two sorts of considerations have already tempered the Hofstadter view. In his studies of
business thought Irving Wyllie finds little evidence that businessmen
invoked the Darwinian catchwords in their own defense. And on the
scientific side Loren Eiseley has demonstrated that Darwin himself
retreated from his catchwords by de-emphasizing struggle and stressing
the Lamarckian principle of inheritance.3 Moreover, my own reading
of allegedly conservative Darwinian texts suggests that Wyllie's conclusions may be extended to professionals and other intellectuals as
well, in the sense that the Darwinian phrases functioned in the debates
of the Gilded Age quite differently than pictured in the traditional accounts.4 What then of the contemporary testimony? Wyllie specifically
urges caution in evaluating these statements. But the allegations of
Ward and others, although often quoted, have not been so scrutinized.
A detailed study of the development of the charge from the 1870's on,
2Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (Boston, 1955), 5-6.
"Conservative Darwinism" is also described in Carleton B. Hayes, Generation of Materialism (New York, 1941), 9-13, 46, 113-14, 229; J. Barzun, Darwin, Marx, Wagner
(London, 1942), 42, 67-9, 100-10; T. Cochran and W. Miller, Age of Enterprise (New
York, 1942), 119-50; M. Curti, The Growth of American Thought (2nd ed., New York,
1943), 569-77, 640-41, 670-71; Stow Persons (ed.), Evolutionary Thought in America
(New Haven, 1950); H. S. Commager, American Mind (New Haven, 1950), 199-226;
E. Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny (New York, 1952), 85-104; S. Fine, Laissez
Faire and the General Welfare State (Ann Arbor, 1956); and in modified form in S.
Persons, American Minds (New York, 1958).
3I. Wyllie, The Self Made Man (Rutgers, 1954), esp. 86; "Social Darwinism and the
Businessman," Proc. Am. Phil. Soc. CIII (1959), 629-35. Loren Eiseley, Darwin's
Century (New York, 1958). Tempering is evident in several recent texts, including R. J.
Wilson, ed. Darwinism and the American Intellectual (Homewood, Illinois, 1967),
93-106; G. Daniels, ed. Darwinism Comes to America (Waltham, Mass., 1968); and
John A. Garraty, The American Nation (New York, 1966), 475-76.
4I am currently preparing a reassessment of the "social Darwinism" of such
American conservatives as William Graham Sumner, as part of a general study of Darwinism and American social thought from 1860 to 1920.
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it will be argued here, places the debates of conservatives and their opponents in new perspective, and suggests that later historical accounts
were in an important sense a final chapter in the same exchange.
Although the Origin of Species gained considerable acceptance in
the decade following its publication, many Americans in the 1870's
continued to find reason to suspect Darwinism. An odium theologium
lingered, often buttressed by a philosophical idealism that distrusted
the "materialism" and "fatalism" associated with the evolutionary
hypothesis. The fact that Darwin had been inspired in part by the
writings of Robert Malthus made him even more suspect to the many
who opposed Malthusianism. What might happen when religion, philosophy, and politics fused, became apparent in the writings of three
opponents of classical economics in the 1870's: Henry Carey, America's leading Protectionist; John L. Peck, an anti-Spencerian who in
1879 built on the work of Carey in a discussion of The Political Economy of Democracy; and Francis Bowen, Professor of Philosophy at
Harvard, who in the same year warned readers of the North American
Review of the dangers of "Malthusianism, Darwinism and Pessimism."
Son of Mathew Carey, who helped shape Clay's American System, Henry C. Carey fused Adam Smith's faith in natural law with
the elder Carey's devotion to the American dream of economic opportunity for all. Like his father, Henry rejected the ideas of Malthus and
Ricardo but he amended Smith's theories to adopt Protectionism in
the 1840's. Nature, Carey urged in opposition to Malthus, worked toward a universal harmony of interests, the theme of his many books of
the pre-Civil War period. The perfect social science would provide
men "the highest individualism and the greatest power of association
with his fellow men," an "association" which the twentieth century
would term national planning.5 In the Unity of Law (1872), his final
work, Carey restated this creed for the post-war generation. Rooting
social science more firmly than ever in natural philosophy, he drew
heavily on E. L. Youmans' Correlation and Conservation of Forces
(1865), which translated the latest findings of physics into a celebration of the ultimate unity of matter and spirit. So sustained, Carey insisted again that the laws of society and of nature were one, thus
further guaranteeing absolute certainty to principles he secretly feared
had not brought perfection or unity to society.6
In the original text of the Unity of Law, Carey ignored Darwinism, perhaps because he suspected the Origin threatened his pur5A. D. H. Kaplan, Henry Charles Carey (Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies in Historical and Political Science, XLIX. no. 4, 1931), 82. Ralph H. Gabriel, The Course oj
American Democratic Thought (New York, 1940), 80-86.
6Kaplan,Carey, 61.
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pose, or perhaps because Darwin's views concerning human society
were being published in The Descent of Man just as Carey prepared
his work for press. With the appearance of the Descent, however,
Carey answered Darwin in hastily added footnotes and textual insertions. The result was an early instance of the spectre of conservative
Darwinism. Carey conceded that most men faced a life of poverty,
pestilence, and war. For this state of affairs the followers of Adam
Smith offered no cure: material wealth and its transfer were their
sole concern, not the mental and moral aspect of economic life. "Need
we now wonder," Carey asked, "that a system so thoroughly materialistic should have given rise to a school from which we learn, that 'survival of the fittest,' and crushing out of the less 'fitted,' constitute
the basis of all natural arrangements for promoting advance in
civilization?"7
Had Darwin himself actually taught such a lesson? A careful reading of The Unity of Law suggests that Carey compounded several
quite different elements in his charge. He specifically criticized a passage in the Descent in which Darwin wondered briefly what effect
vaccination and similar measures would have upon the future wellbeing of the human race. Darwin-in passages that Carey ignoredmade it clear that his concern was fleeting: men had no choice but to
go ahead with such measures. Carey ignored this conclusion because,
more than vaccination, his concern was the general neglect of social
problems that had "from the days of Malthus" been "the tendency of
the teachings of the British school." Religion and economics merged.
How could one continue to believe in a God, Carey asked, "whose
laws, as now generally exhibited, tend toward reducing the millions
to a condition of mere hewers of wood and drawers of water for those
few who are encouraged to eat, drink, and make merry, while providing measures for securing at the earliest moment, the 'elimination' of
those who, being poor and uninstructed, are incapable of self-protection." Darwinism and Malthusianism shared a common spirit. Each
was "materialistic," a symptom of the worst tendencies of the new
age. Together they provided "for the use of science a politico-economic man, a monster, on the one hand influenced solely by the thirst
for wealth, and on the other so entirely under the control of sexual
passion as to be at all times ready to indulge it." That such a philosophy appeared further to justify international warfare, Carey added,
made it only the more reprehensible. Thus were routed atheistic Darwinism, callous laissez-faire, and for good measure, the militarist
spirit.8
?HenryCarey, The Unity of Law (Philadelphia, 1872), xvii, 157, 183, 295.
8Ibid., xviii-xix, 59, 370-72. Cf. C. Darwin, Descent of Man (2 vols., New York,

1872), I, 161-63.
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Like Carey, the economist-philosopher John Lord Peck joined
concern for man's soul with interest in his social condition. In his first
book, The Ultimate Generalization (1876), philosophical and spiritual
concerns sparked a vigorous attack on Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy. Peck for the moment avoided the social implications of evolution, but in The Political Economy of Democracy (1879), he spoke
directly to social issues. Peck's specific program included a graduated tax, compulsory education, the appropriation of railroad land
for settlers, a steady money supply (neither hard nor soft), and moderate protection in the interests of labor. But more generally he focused
on a comparison of the classical English school and the views of Carey,
whom he (somewhat inaccurately) made a supporter of his proposals.
After describing the views of both schools, and in particular Carey's
attacks on Malthusianism, Peck then echoed a charge of conservative
Darwinism much like that which appeared in Unity of Law. "It is
assumed that the best man will win in the struggle for existence (that
is, wealth)," he wrote, summarizing the "English School," "and thus
the survival of the fittest, in agreement with the law of Natural Selection will be secured." Peck even more than Carey did not suppose that
men could "escape the law of the survival of the fittest." "The Superior
will live and thrive at the expense of the inferior, in trade and industry as truly as in the conflicts of savages, or in the chase of wild beasts
for their prey," he conceded. "But the superiority should be superiority of intelligence and character, not one of wealth and good fortune
merely." Government, by enacting his proposals, would guarantee
such superiority.9
Like Carey, Francis Bowen of Harvard absorbed Darwinism in
the latter part of a distinguished career devoted to Christianity and
the protective tariff. Like Peck and Carey he was also a staunch opponent of Malthusianism. But Bowen was also a philosopher whose
devotion to Idealism gave his crusade an added dimension. In the
early 1860's, he joined battle with both Positivism and evolutionism,
whether manifested in the Origin of Species or in Henry Thomas
Buckle's "gospel of fatalism and unbelief." In the mid-1870's he added
other philosophers to his list, in particular the Germans Schopenhauer
and von Hartmann whose work he criticized in Modern Philosophy
(1877).10

Bowen's attack on "Malthusianism, Darwinism, and Pessimism"
(1879) wed these several concerns into a plea for patrician fertility,
family life, and colonial (or western) settlement. Taking his foes in
9John L. Peck, The Ultimate Generalization (New York, 1876); The Political Economy of Democracy (Philadelphia, 1879), 3-29.
'?F. Bowen, Gleanings of a Literary Life, 1838-80 (New York, 1880), passim;
Modern Philosophy (New York, 1877).
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turn, Bowen first attacked Malthus and his followers for callousness
in the face of human misery, an attitude which in Bowen's view was
the more unjustified since decline in population during the century had
entirely disproved Malthus' theory. The Harvard professor was especially appalled that people of "wealth," "culture," and "refinement"
had apparently taken Malthus to heart in limiting their own numbers.
He then noted that Darwinism as an extension of Malthus' theory was
refuted by these same demographic facts: in the "struggle for existence" among men the lower orders, not the upper classes, survive;
"And this victory is a survival not of the fittest, but of the unfittest.
. ." Anyway, he added, Darwinism had triumphed not because it was
proved, but because it served the cause of irreligion. The "sole innovation" of Darwinism upon general evolutionism was a mechanical
materialism, and it was this that provided "the pepper which made the
dish palatable to . . . those English and German naturalists who had
a previous bias in favor of materialism .... " Finally, came pessimism,

which in German philosophy was but an extension of this same spirit,
depriving men of all hope of future happiness, and hence of the will
either to reform the world or to multiply and "fill the vacant places
on the earth's surface." Unless the spell were broken, Bowen concluded, sounding a familiar variation on New England's fears of decline, America would go the way of the Roman Empire.1
Although Bowen implied as much, he was less direct than Carey
and Peck in charging that Darwinists literally called for a "survival of
the fittest" in society.12 Instead he merely assumed that Darwinists
so argued in order to demonstrate that demography refuted their entire position. Like Carey and Peck he reasoned that Malthusianism
(which he disliked) issued in Darwinism (which he also disliked). The
two might thus be interchanged and attacked accordingly. Neither
Carey, Peck, nor Bowen identified specific contemporaries who buttressed laissez-faire with Darwinism, an omission the more surprising in Peck's case given his animus toward Spencer.13 In fact
Carey's cautious mention of the "tendency" of British thought, Peck's
obvious paraphrase, and Bowen's circumlocutions make one wonder
if any meant literally to identify conservative Darwinists, or if rather
they had forged their various fears and uncertainties into a highly inaccurate description of modern thought.
Henry George opposed Protectionism and singled out Carey for
special attack. But his indictment of "buttressed" Malthusianism in
"F. Bowen, "Malthusianism, Darwinism, and Pessimism," North American Review CXXIX (1879), 450-51, 456, 470-72.
'2Cf. Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, 88.
'3In The Kingdom of the Selfish (New York, 1889), 221, 242 ff. Peck singled out
Sumner and Spencer. His guide was Lester Ward discussed below.
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Progress and Poverty, directly echoed that of the Protectionists.14
Malthusian doctrines had always obstructed reform, George wrote,
and "of late years" the theory had "received new support in the rapid
change of ideas as to the origin of man and the genesis of species."
Poverty, a noted economist had written, provided a powerful stimulus
to industry and progress. "What is this," George demanded, "but the
recognition in regard to human society of the developing effects of the
'struggle for existence' and 'survival of the fittest.'" The evolution
philosophy bred "materialism" and "fatalism." A philosophy that
denied God allied itself naturally with an economics that believed
"that nature wastes men by constantly bringing them into being where
there is no room for them."15
Sustaining these charges was George's instinctive devotion to
Christianity and faith in a universe in which natural and moral law
were ultimately one-"eighteenth century superstitions," as Bernard
Shaw described them when he heard George speak in London. George
was not ignorant of the latest thought: Progress and Poverty bristled
with the names of Buckle, Bagehot, Maine, and Spencer. But George's
sympathies and assumptions were those of the Enlightenment-of
Benjamin Franklin or Joseph Priestly, through whose eyes he invited
readers to survey nineteenth-century progress. The best efforts of
social science and economics could not improve the "moral law":
this was the message of Progress and Poverty. Purged of impurities,
Bagehot, Maine, and others demonstrated that "association in equality
is the law of progress," which in turn was naught "but the moral law."
"The economic law and the moral law" were also "essentially one."
"The truth which the intellect grasps after toilsome effort is but that
which the moral sense reaches by a quick intuition."16
Darwinism upset such happy assumptions. Throughout his career
George harbored suspicion of the theory, a suspicion that colored his
thought no less than Carey's and Bowen's. In Progress and Poverty he
attempted to evade the issue. How men had originated was not his
concern: "all we know of him is as man." But his hostility was plain.
During the 1880's he mellowed somewhat, comforted by the views of
the British biologist A. R. Wallace (who early preached the "limits
of evolution as applied to man," and who also befriended George during his English crusade) and of St. George Mivart, a leading Christian
evolutionist who, more firmly than Wallace, denied that natural selection has shaped human faculties. By the 1890's George could manage
grudging acceptance. "In a sense" all men believed in evolution, and
14Georgementioned Carey in Progress and Poverty, 35, 227-28, in Protection or
Free Trade (New York, 1941), 9, 79, and in The Science of Political Economy (New
York, 1941), 93-4, 196.
'5George,Progress and Poverty, 99-102, 480-81, 558.
"6CharlesA. Barker, Henry George (New York, 1955), 376; George, Progress and
Poverty, 508, 526, 560.
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indeed always had, he wrote. But, he confessed, he remained "unable to
see the weight of the evidence of man's descent from other animals."17
The absence of Darwinian rhetoric in George's writings mirrored
these doubts. At a time when reformers increasingly turned to Darwinism for their arguments ("reform Darwinism"), George chose his
analogies from physics, astronomy, or pre-Darwinian anatomy. "Evolution," insofar as it figures in his work, boiled down to Spencer's
formula that progress was a movement from an "indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity." The laws
of society were as unchangeable as the "laws of gravitation." The "evolution of society" and the "development of the species" revealed a
"close analogy" only in the sense that the "bodies," physiological and
political, resembled one another.'8 Whom then did George-uneasy
in the face of Darwinism-consider the "buttressed" Malthusians and
evolutionary fatalists? The answer is interesting because George did
name names, at least four of which have figured in later accounts of
conservative Darwinism.'9
The first Darwinist was the British author, Winwood Reade, whom
George cited as an evolutionary fatalist, and who later appeared in at
least two accounts of social Darwinism.20 The work in question was
Reade's The Martyrdom of Man (1872). The author had intended to
make his subject "The Origin of Mind" until The Descent of Man
seemed to leave little to add. Reade instead contented himself with illustrating Darwin with the aid of his own observations of "savage" life
in Africa. Reade's central point, in keeping with the conventional
wisdom of mid-Victorian England, was that civilized man transcended
the struggles that marred his emergence from barbarism. Reade's
contrasts of savagery and civilization forecast Darwinian blueprints
of colonialism that would emerge in later decades, while his descriptions of the origin of mind and of man's ability to control nature was
of the sort that later inspired many reform Darwinist formulations.
Reade was also a Comtist and it was his final aim to picture the Tri'George, Progress and Poverty, 476; Barker, George, 339, 359-60; George, A
Perplexed Philosopher(London, 1937), 105-6.
'8George, Progress and Poverty, 514, also Free Trade, 160; Social Problems
(New York, 1949), 1.
'9The four are Winwood Reade, William Graham Sumner, Herbert Spencer, anu
Edward L. Youmans. Although George probably made only a minor contribution to
Sumner's and Spencer's reputations as "conservative Darwinists," his criticisms of
Reade and Youmans appear to have influenced directly later accounts. For Reade, see
Barzun, Darwin, 108 and Goldman, Rendezvous, 91-2. For Youmans see Hofstadter,
Social Darwinism, 34; Commager, American Mind, 202; Goldman, Rendezvous,
85; and Fine, Laissez Faire, 136 n. George, Progress and Poverty, 100-01 also identified
a fifth individual-first quoting a statement by the vehemently anti-Darwinian Louis
Agassiz that Darwinism was "Malthus all over," and then rendering a Darwinian
paraphraseof the pre-Darwinianeconomist E. R. McCulloch.
20Barzun,Darwin, 108;Goldman, Rendezvous, 91-2.
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umph of Positivism over orthodox religion, which he did in his closing
chapters.21

George chose the example of Reade because "in a semi-scientific
or popularized form this modern fatalism may perhaps be seen . . .
best." To illustrate his point, he provided a brief quotation in which
Reade observed that "our own progress is founded on the agonies of
the past." Reade wondered: "Is it therefore unjust that we also should
suffer for the benefit of those who are to come." George here saw the
spectre of Malthusianism. "In this view progress is the result of forces
which work slowly, steadily, and remorselessly, for the elevation of
man," he noted. "War, slavery, tyranny, superstition, famine and
pestilence are the impelling causes which drive men on, by eliminating
poorer types and extending the higher." He concluded by attacking
Reade's "materialism."22
Regrettably, in his haste to illustrate his argument, George overlooked the remainder of the same passage in The Martyrdom of Man,
an oversight perpetuated in later histories. Reade indeed believed that
past suffering had yielded civilization. But he was equally certain that
such physical suffering had no present or future role. The complete
passage reads:
Famine, pestilence,and war are no longer essential for the advancementof
the human race. But a season of mentalanguishis at hand, and throughthis
we must pass in order that our posterity may rise. The soul must be sacrificed;the hope in immortalitymust die. A sweet and charmingillusionmust
be taken from the human race, as youth and beautyvanishneverto return.23
The argument, that is, concerned Positivism. The new agonies would
be spiritual, the "disturbance and distress," as Reade termed it, that
resulted from moving from the religious through the metaphysical to
the positivist stage. Irreverent Reade was, and perhaps condescending
toward "inferior" peoples, and for these reasons he stirred George's
sensibilities. But he was not, as George suggested, urging poverty and
social inaction in the name of Darwin and progress.
During the 1880's George added a second name to support his conviction that "science" somehow furthered inaction. William Graham
Sumner of Yale, the "reverend professor" of Political Economy as
George called him, offended the Californian's deepest convictions no
less than did Reade, and was a considerably greater threat to the
Single Tax program.24 Progress, said Sumner, was the result of man's
21W. Reade, The Martyrdom of Man (22nd ed., London, n.d.), passim.
22Progressand Poverty, 480-81.
23Reade,Martyrdom, 543-44. See Barzun, 108;Goldman, 91-2.
24For the Sumner-George exchange see Sumner's review of Progress and Poverty
(New York Times, June 6, 1880); What Social Classes Owe Each Other (New York,
1911), esp. 22, 48-52, 68; George, Social Problems, 63, 67, 72. George also attacked
Sumner in Free Trade, 250-52.
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victory in a "struggle for existence" against nature-capital being
both the instrumentand effect of such triumph.Among men there obtained a "competitionof life," the rules of which were relativeto the
characterof the strugglewith nature,and whichthus alteredonly gradually. A confirmed Malthusian, Sumner argued for strict laissezfaire, and even on two or three occasions(of which George was apparently unaware)did indeed attempt to buttress his position by saying
that the alternativeto the "survivalof the fittest" was the "survival
of the unfittest,"a tactic that drew criticism upon him and which he
avoided in What Social Classes Owe Each Other. However "conserva-

tive" he may have been, Sumnerwas firm on two points:the "struggle
for existence" was not necessarily fierce (in fact was relatively easy
in the modernperiod),and was not a battle among men as Darwinianoriented critics often interpretedit; and free access to nature would
benefit everyone (not just an elite), in particularthe Forgotten Men
of the MiddleClasses.25
In attacking the "reverendprofessor," George blurred precisely
these points, the result being a numberof subtle distortionsof Sumner's position. Engagedin polemics, George naturally had little concern for the finerpointsof Sumner'sposition.But more importantthan
the distortions (that need not be detailed here) was the fact that
George's hostility to Darwinism clearly figured in his attack. His
charge that Sumner accepted a "fierce struggle for existence" and
slow "race evolution" requiredlittle in the way of further argument,
because to George the phrases instinctivelysuggestedan undesirable
state of affairs.
In A PerplexedPhilosopher(1892), George added Herbert Spencer and his leadingAmericandisciple, EdwardL. Youmans,to his list
of conservativeevolutionists.At that time he insisted that he had attacked Spencerianism all along. Actually, Progress and Poverty
oweda great deal to Spencer.JudgingSocial Statics "a noblebook, and
in the deepestsense a religiousmindedbook," George found in it not
only refutation of the "expediency"he opposed, but the germ of
his entire theory that private property in land violated the law of
equityand was at the root of the social problem.Like Spencer,George
desired minimal government.Despite its call for abolition of private
propertyin land, sections of Progress and Poverty read like Spencer
on "over-legislation."More generally,he shared with the Englishman
25Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, 56-57, speculates that Sumner distinguished the
"struggle for existence" from the "competition of life" "perhaps ... to dull the resentment of the poor toward the rich." However, Hofstadter continues, Sumner "did not
at all times . . . shrink from a direct analogy between animal struggle and human competition." Hofstadter offers no evidence of such direct analogies, and I have been unable to find any in Sumner's writings. Rather Sumner's rigid insistence on the distinction was part of an overall effort to salvage classical economics while avoiding the crude
"social Darwinism" with which he is charged.
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a desire to ground matter and spirit, expediency and morality, in an
overarching cosmic law. If in 1879 George had doubts concerning the
direction of Spencer's thought, he muted them, and invoked both
the name and rhetoric of the philosopher in support of his cause.26
A Perplexed Philosopher, in contrast, was the work of a jilted
suitor, and read like breach of promise proceedings. George had
learned as early as 1882 that Spencer would not endorse the Single
Tax, a loss that was a distinct blow to his pride and his crusade.
Spencer was "horribly conceited" he confided to a friend following
their first meeting. Spencer has not merely changed his mind, George
added later: he was "going the way of Comte . . . going insane from

vanity." When Spencer formally revised Social Statics in 1892 and removed the sections concerning land tenure, George published all his
bitterness. Spencer had been "dishonest ...

in a way that makes flat

falsehood seem manly." He had "betrayed" the cause. His motives
had been sordid throughout.27
In this spirit George turned to consider the evolutionary philosophy. Forgetting Winwood Reade, he moved Spencer to center stage.
The foe remained "materialism," but George levelled the charge directly against the Unknowable, which was not God whatever Spencer's
defenders claimed. Social Statics (which he continued to praise) had
been "a protest against materialism," a call to reformers to regard,
not simple expediency, but "a divinely appointed order to which, if it
would prosper, society must conform." The Synthetic Philosophy,
however, was "materialistic" and "fatalistic."28
Yet did "fatalism" necessarily mean conservatism? Turning to
this question, George surveyed some of the same philosophical issues
with which Bowen had earlier wrestled. Fatalism, George noted, was
very much like its opposite-the emphasis on total will and the "renunciation of the will to live," such as Schopenhauer preached. This
doctrine; in turn, was the European equivalent of a philosophy which
in India, as everyone knew, led to a "hopelessness of reform." "It
seems to me that the essential fatalism of the evolutionary philosophy
would have a similar result," George speculated. He then plunged to
his conclusion: "as the pessimistic philosophy of the one [Schopenhauer and/or Indians] seems to flow from the abandonment of action
for mere speculation . . . so the evolutionary philosophy of the other
seems to be such as might result from the abandonment of a noble
purpose ...

to embrace the pleasant ways of acquiescence in things as

they are." "It is not for me to say what is cause and what is effect," he
added.29
26Progressand Poverty, 359-60, 364,404, 480, 487, 504.
27Spencer, "Letter to the St. James's Gazette," Perplexed Philosopher, 52-61;
George to E. R. Taylor, March 1882, Henry George Jr., The Life of Henry George,
Worksof Henry George (New York, 1911), X, 370; Perplexed Philosopher, 58, 67, 97.
29Ibid.,118-20.
28PerplexedPhilosopher, 101-3.
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The proof of George's conjectures was Edward L. Youmans, his
fourth contribution to later histories.30 Come to think of it, George
added in a footnote, the editor of Popular Science nicely illustrated his
point. In a conversation with George ten years previously, Youmans
fell into speakingwith muchwarmthof the politicalcorruptionof New York
and of the uttercarelessnessand selfishnessof the rich, and of their readiness
to submitto it ... whereverit servedtheir money getting purposesto do so.
. .. Alludingto a conversationsome time before,in which I had affirmedand
he had deniedthe duty of taking part in politics,I said to him, "Whatdo you
proposeto do aboutit?"
Of a suddenhis mannerand tone were completelychanged,as remembering his Spencerianismhe threw himself back, and replied, with something
like a sigh, "Nothing! You and I can do nothing at all. It's all a matter of
evolution."
George admitted the incident was incongruous. Youmans had "warm
and generous sympathies"; his Spencerianism "seemed to me like an
ill fitting coat he had accidentally picked up and put on." But such was
the effect of the evolutionary philosophy.31
George indeed had reason to debate both Spencer and Youmans.
Spencer's devotion to laissez-faire had hardened as its support in fact
and theory slipped away; and Youmans, in demanding careful study of
society, often appealed to evolution (although not Darwinism) against
reform in general and the Single Tax in particular. But the conversation which George reported not only misrepresented Youmans, but,
combined with his other allegations, has contributed to the distortion
of Spencerianism in the entire period.
The two men had chatted in the early 1880's, but each took
away quite different impressions from their exchanges. Youmans'
apparent resignation and lack of interest in politics irritated George.
"He would not take the trouble to vote at election time," George
grumbled to a friend when Youmans did not share his enthusiasm for
Democratic party politics in 1880. Youmans "said we should have to
slowly evolute." "And," George added, he "has told me several times
that there was no use in trying to fight evils of which he himself is as
conscious as anyone, as to get rid of them is a matter of thousands of
years."
Youmans on the other hand was equally impatient with George, as
he explained in an attack on Progress and Poverty that drew the above
complaints from George. Concerning George's proclamation that "association in equality is the law of progress," Youmans exploded, "It
30Youmans'sstatement to George is cited in Goldman, Rendezvous, 85; Hofstadter
Social Darwinism, 34; Fine, Laissez-Faire, 44; Commager, The American Mind, 202.
31PerplexedPhilosopher, 119.
32Georgeto E. R. Taylor, Jan. 21, 1881 in George, George, 343-44.
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sounds like last century talk." Surely George could not so blithely
ignore the "whole continent of facts that have been upheaved during
the last two or three generations" concerning the early stages of man's
development-whether by Spencer or Bagehot on the one hand, or
Darwin in the Descent on the other? How in this age of science and
induction could George dwell "in an ideal world," taught by "novelists, dramatists, and poets"? Youmans was no fatalist, but in conclusion
he suggested that he was well aware that certain of his opponents
would claim so. "Let it not be said that science thus becomes obstructive, and paralyzes exertion," he wrote, as if anticipating the exact
form of George's later charge; "on the contrary, it is promotive of
real progress by checking futile effort, and disclosing the conditions
and the way by which exertion may be made more effectual and substantial conquests achieved."33
Historians may well judge the merits of the Single Tax superior to
those of Civil Service reform, hard money, or laissez-faire economics.
But it is another matter to fashion George's subjective characterizations of Reade and the others into an objective description of the
laissez-faire

argument: "What is this but .

.. ,

"seems to me,"

"would have had a similar result." Was George not thus acknowledging, as did Bowen and Carey, that he found a meaning in the words of
his opponents that they themselves did not intend? Did Henry George
and his fellow liberals really face a "steel chain of ideas" welded by
Darwin and Spencer?
The writings of two other Gilded Age reformers shed further light
on these questions. Henry Demarest Lloyd, critic of Standard Oil, and
Edward Bellamy, author of Looking Backward (1888), agreed with
George that appeals to "survival of the fittest" and "natural selection"
had strengthened the conservative defense. Reform, in turn, demanded
a re-reading of Darwin, which they provided.
As each made his case, a threefold pattern could be discerned.
First, Darwinism seemed to describe accurately the nature of contemporary American society. "In cannibalistic times, the best mankillers and maneaters survive," Lloyd noted in the mid-1880's, "in a
selfish civilization the Vanderbilts and Rockefellers." As he put it
in Wealth against Commonwealth (1894), "some inner circle of
'fittest'" had sought and obtained control of America.34 Bellamy
agreed. The Utopians in Looking Backward saw nineteenth-century
civilization as "a struggle for existence." "The principle of competition," intoned the Bellamyite Nationalist platform, "is simply the
application of the brutal law of the survival of the strongest and most
33Youmans, "Forces of Human Progress," Popular Science Monthly, XVIII
(1881), 553-56.
34Lloyd, Notebook IX (1888), 215, H. D. Lloyd Papers, Wisconsin Historical
Society; WealthAgainst Commonwealth (New York, 1894), 3-4.
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cunning."35 Secondly, each alleged that an increasing number of
Americans justified this situation by invoking Darwinian terminology.
Seizing upon a statement in a trust hearing in which a witness confessed the "weakest must go first," Lloyd gave it a Darwinist twist and
charged that the creed was that "practically professed" in business.36
"Charity," wrote one Bellamyite, "preaches that some must go to the
wall in order that others may ascend to the top round of the material
ladder: which is complacently declared to be the law of the survival of
the fittest."37 Finally, each insisted that, if properly understood, Darwinism really supported reform. "Darwinian principles," argued
Lloyd, "are enough to give a scientific basis to the doctrine that no
class can be allowed . . . to hold an exclusive proprietary interest in
anything."38 In Looking Backward, Bellamy likewise saw both general evolution and the more specifically Darwinian doctrine of "sexual
selection" as chief agencies producing the new Utopia.39
Like George, Lloyd and Bellamy provided few particulars in their
indictments. Lloyd at one point in the 1880's jotted in his notebook an
isolated Darwinian remark by the Englishman Henry Maine (the often
quoted comparison of competition to a "beneficent private war"issuing in "the survival of the fittest"). In 1896, he seized upon Benjamin
Kidd's Social Evolution (1894) as yet another example of what had
been going on for some time. But even his analysis of this volume suggests only that he read what he expected and that he missed the
unique twist that Kidd had given the Darwinian argument. More significantly, in noting in Wealth against Commonwealth that "survival
of the fittest" was the creed "practically confessed" in business, Lloyd
tacitly acknowledged that the practice was as he himself, not the businessmen, saw it.40
Bellamy and his followers were equally offhand in their choice of
conservative Darwinists, discrediting the opposition by finding Darwinian meanings where they were not intended. The Hegelian William Torrey Harris was a Darwinist, suggested one writer in the
Nationalist, because the conservative Commissioner of Education
defended competition by going back "as he must ... to 'natural law'."
What was this law but "the survival of the fittest," the Nationalist
asked, "the acme of individualism, and a colossal selfishness." "But
this seems [n.b.]," he concluded, "to be Professor Harris's ideal." On
at least one occasion a defender of modified laissez-faire, goaded by
35Bellamy, Looking Backward (New York, 1951), 213-27; A. Morgan, Edward
Bellamy (New York, 1944), 262; Jesse Cox, "Objections to Nationalism," Nationalist,
III (1889), 325-30.
36Lloyd,Wealthagainst Commonwealth, 494-95.
37MarthaAvery, "The Curse of Charity," Nationalist, I (1889), 184-87.
38Lloyd,Notebook I (eye) (1887), 122, Lloyd Papers.
39Bellamy,Looking Backward, 213-27.
40Lloyd,Notebook G (1888), 112; XVIII (1890), 475; "Kidd's 'Social Evolution',"
MSS Additional (1896), 1-3, Lloyd Papers; Wealthagainst Commonwealth, 494-95.
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references to the "brutal" laws of nature, offered protest in order to
counter the reformers' advantage. Thus the economist Francis A.
Walker in a review of Looking Backward attacked such a reference in
the Nationalist platform. "There is an old proverb that says, Speak
well of the bridge that has carried you safely over," he cautioned, lecturing the Bellamyites on the past role of struggle. Walker added that
he would deem anyone who ignored this debt "utterly lacking in the
biological sense," and urged more, not less, competition. And, for
this brief excursion, he became to readers of the Nationalist another
representative of dominant Darwinian reactionism.41
Had these charges of conservative Darwinism been confined to
openly partisan appeals they might well have been dismissed by historians. But from the start the allegation had support of a more
weighty sort from many social scientists who were disturbed, as the
President of the Social Science Association put it, by "our friends of
the pessimistic school [who] dwell with grim satisfaction on the
doctrine that teaches the 'survival of the fittest.' "42 Themselves reformers, many of these social scientists shared the general sympathies
of George, Lloyd, and Bellamy, but added to them professional and
often somewhat technical methodological concerns that considerably
complicated their relation with Darwinism, and in particular with
Herbert Spencer to whom many owed a great debt. No one better illustrates the effects of such complications than Lester Frank Ward.
Author of Dynamic Sociology (1883), Ward held a virtual monopoly
in American sociology in its earliest years and subsequently won the
plaudits of a younger generation who spread his gospel in the universities of the middle west and east during the 1890's and after. Rediscovered in the 1930's Ward seemed to a generation of New Deal
liberals an "American Aristotle" whose "sociocracy" forecast the
general outline of Roosevelt's program. Few individuals, it also happens, were more active in alerting contemporaries to the dangers of
conservative Darwinism.43
Ward, alone among the reformers here considered, dealt with the
4Herbert Birdsall, "Professor Harris's Discovery," Nationalist, II (1890), 61-3.
Cf. Harris, "Edward Bellamy's Vision," Forum, VIII (1889), 207-8. Francis A. Walker,
"Mr. Bellamy and the New Nationalist Party," Atlantic Monthly, LXV (1890), 26162. Cobb, "General Walker," op. cit. Harris and Walker in fact illustrate the Hegelianism and classical economics, respectively, that sustained the conservative position
during the period.
42FranklinB. Sanborn, "The Social Sciences," J. Soc. Sci., XXI (1886), 5; J. W.
Powell, "Competition as a Factor in Human Evolution," American Anthropologist, old
series I (1888), 297-323; James C. Welling, "The Turning Point of Modern Sociological
Science," Anthrop. Soc. Washington, Transactions, II (1882), 22-25; J. B. Clark, The
Philosophy of Wealth (Boston, 1886), 135, 200, 219; E. A. Ross, Foundations of Sociology (New York, 1900), 341-43.
43Samuel Chugerman, Lester Ward, the American Aristotle (Durham, N.C.
1939).
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issue explicitly in terms of the phrase "social Darwinism," although
not until late in his career.44 However as early as the 1870's he had
begun, like the others, to fashion an image of a conservative Darwinist
opposition. A first step came in a detailed definition of "nature" much
like that which Lloyd and Bellamy accepted less consciously. Nature,
wrote Ward in an early critique of Spencer, was not the orderly integration of matter postulated in the Synthetic Philosophy, but a wasteful push and pull in which massive positive ("integrative") forces
were necessary merely to hold negative ("disintegrative") forces at
bay. Ward noted further that this struggle and waste had parallels in
society. "The wars of men with their surroundings, with wild beasts,
and with one another, are the strict analogues of those of the lower
forms." "Even the silent battle for subsistence has its counterpart in
the competitive struggles of industry." Waste was everywhere: "in
wanton destruction of forests, slaughter of wild animals, and the pestilence and filth of urban civilization."45
During the 1880's Ward gradually came to the further conclusion
that defenders of the existing order were interpreting "natural law"
in Darwinian terms. At first he was merely suspicious: of "representatives of science" who stood "boldly in the track of current events";
or of the social "tenor and tendency" of recent scientific theory. In
Dynamic Sociology (1883) he voiced some of this suspicion. But despite his criticism of Spencer in this book he continued to insist that
the Englishman was one of several pioneers who had "builded better
than he knew." He thus stopped short of charging him with misuses of
Darwinian terminology.46
This honor Ward saved for William Graham Sumner whose Social Classes (1884) outraged him both as a sociologist and a reformer
and provided proof of his previous suspicions. Ward's attack had a
familiar ring. Translating Sumner's Malthusianism into Darwinism,
Ward charged that Sumner "degraded" human activity "to a complete
level with those of animals." Refutation followed. "Those who have
survived simply prove their fitness to survive." The "fact that fitness
to survive is something wholly distinct from real superiority, is, of
course, ignored by the author because he is not a biologist, as all sociologists should be." At the same time, Ward recognized parallels
between human and animal struggle that Sumner would have denied,
using such parallels as reasons why Art must replace Nature. In subsequent articles Ward further suggested that Sumner was not alone in
4Esp. Ward, "Social Darwinism," Am. J. Soc., XII (1907), 709-10.
45Ward, "Cosmic and Organic Evolution," (1877), Glimpses, II, 148-63; "The
Scientific Basis of Positive Political Economy," (1882), ibid., III, 32-35.
46Ward, "Political-Social Functions," ibid., II, 336-37; "Scientific Basis," ibid.,
III, 47; Dynamic Sociology (2 vols., New York, 1883), I, 7-8; E. L. Youmans ed.,
Herbert Spencer and the Americans (New York, 1883), 79.
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his errors. The Yale professor was but the most extreme of Spencer's
"disciples, particularly in America, [who] delight in going even further than their master," he wrote in 1884.47
Between the mid-1880's and the time when Ward was forced explicitly to define "social Darwinism" in 1905, at least one additional
factor shaped his thought concerning the conservative Darwinist opposition. The assault of the so-called neo-Darwinians (led by August
Weismann) in the early 1890's pushed Ward squarely into the neoLamarckian camp, and in doing so further identified "Darwinism,"
in his thinking, with animality and generally ignoble activity. In response to Weismann's suggestion that no acquired characteristics
could be inherited, he proposed what amounted to a convenient division of labor between neo-Darwinians and neo-Lamarckians. Natural
selection explained man's animal characteristics, up to and including
the intellect manifested in commercial cunning. Lamarckianism explained the higher faculties, the "intense exercise" of which impressed
them "profoundly upon the plastic brain substance and reaction upon
the germs of posterity, . . . transmitted [them] to descendents
through centuries of developing civilization."48

Not coincidentally, this same division was coupled with fresh allegations that unnamed conservatives were misusing biology. In
several articles of the early 1890's Ward repeated his earlier censure
of "nature-worship" by "a certain type of mind . . . strengthened since

Darwin." Upon examining the "practical applications" of neo-Darwinism he found it "to be strikingly in line with the last described."
In methodological terms neo-Lamarckianism stressed the importance
of the "Psychologic Basis of Social Economics." In practical terms it
produced "biological sociologists" urging "survival of the fittest."
"Everyone is now familiar with the general nature of animal economics," Ward wrote, "it is the survival of the fittest in the struggle
for existence."49 George and Lloyd certainly were. And Bellamy, in
an article describing the "Psychologic Basis of Nationalism" told his
followers that Ward's argument "will bear study as furnishing the
best of ammunition for replying to the 'survival of the fittest' argument against nationalism."50
The blend of methodological and political concerns in this charge
of "animal economics" seemed to Ward only natural. Had not Herbert Spencer in his "Justice" (1891) and in revising and reissuing
Social Statics with Man vs. The State (1892) hardened his conserva47Ward,"Professor Sumner's Social Classes" (1884), Glimpses, III, 301-5; "Mind
as a Social Factor," ibid., III, 365; "False Notions of Government" (1887), ibid., IV, 70.
48Ward,"Neo-Darwinism and Neo-Lamarckism" (1891), Glimpses, IV, 290-95.
49Ibid., 291; "Psychologic Basis (1893), ibid., IV, 345-66; "Political Ethics,"
(1894), ibid., V, 38-66; "Plutocracy" (1895), ibid., V, 228-40. Quoted from "Psychologic
Basis," 350.
50Quotedibid., IV, 347.
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tive position? Had he not violated in these tracts crucial distinctions
upon which he had insisted in his earlier writings, in particular his
statement that "survival of the fittest" had no role to play in modern
civilization?51Moreover, was not this same Spencer under attack by a
growing number of sociologists who stressed "imitation" and psychological factors in social development, an attack that might conveniently, if somewhat imprecisely, be termed a criticism of "biological
analogies"? Was not this same emphasis on mental factors reinforced by the resurgence of Idealism in philosophy, and in particular
by Schopenhauer's concept of "will" to which Ward himself was especially attracted?52In sum, if the charge of "animal economics" had
roots in Ward's social concerns in the 1880's, it was revitalized by
scientific, sociological, and philosophical currents in the 1890's.
In 1905 and 1906, Ward learned that others had their own version
of the same charge-"social Darwinism"-directed not only against
laissez-faire, but also against certain eugenic arguments, and against
the view that international struggle and warfare produced progress.
The irony, and the cause of Ward's concern, lay in the fact that he had
argued each of these latter positions himself. Since the early 1890's
he had been mildly interested in "negative" eugenics, as the movement to improve the race via marriage laws and other precautionary
measures was termed.53 And he had also emerged in the same period
as a major American champion of the "struggle" school of sociology,
led in Europe by Ratzenhofer and Gumplowicz.54 Indeed the Russian
sociologist and peace advocate, Novikov, had singled out Ward and the
two Europeans as leading exponents of "le Darwinisme sociale."55
Responding to this turn of events, Ward found himself in a quandary. He knew that in one sense the charge against some eugenicists
and some militarists was not unjust: extremists in both camps often
spiced their appeals with Darwinian slogans.56How could Ward main5'Ward, "Political Ethics," ibid., V, 38-66. Spencer's Principles of Biology (2 vols.,
New York, 1910), I, 553, affirmed that "social arrangements" nullified the "survival of
the fittest" in the case of modern man. Progress in recent centuries might thus be
"ascribed almost wholly" to adaptation on the Lamarckian model.
52See index references to Schopenhauer in Ward, The Psychic Factors of Civilization (Boston, 1892).
53See "Neo-Darwinism," Glimpses, IV, 294-95; "Social Darwinism," Am. J.
Soc., XII (1907), 709-10; "Eugenics, Euthenics, and Eudemics," (1913), Glimpses,
VI, 382-97.
54Esp. Ward, "Contemporary Sociology," American Journal Sociology, VII
(Jan.-May, 1902); Pure Sociology (2nd ed., New York, 1907), 193-220; "Evolution of
Social Structures," American Journal Sociology, X (Mar. 1905), 589-605; "Social and
Biological Struggles," ibid., XIII (Nov. 1907), 289-99; "Motives in Social Conflict,"
ibid. (Feb. 1908), 646; "Social Integration Through Conflict," ibid. (May 1908), 806-7.
55J. Novikov, La Justice et l'Expansion de la Vie (Paris, 1905), discussed in Ward,
Glimpses, VI, 269-71; Novikov, Les Luttes entreSocietes Humaines (Paris, 1893).
56Hofstadter,Social Darwinism, chs. 8, 9.
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tain his positions-which called for neither "positive" steps like
sterilization, on the one hand, nor for militarist-imperialism, on the
other-and at the same time escape the social Darwinist charge? How
in domestic affairs could he urge a "sociocracy" (that would accept
permanent struggle but channel and transform the cosmic conflict),
against socialist Utopias that would suspend conflict altogether, or a
laissez-faire jungle in which brute law was totally accepted?
Attacking these problems, Ward decided that the term "social
Darwinism" must be eliminated. The tactic of Novikov and the others
infuriated him. "The sociologists . . . confound the so-called 'struggle
for existence' with Darwinism, and very few of them have any adequate
idea of what Darwin's phrase 'natural selection' means," he wrote.
"With this vague notion in their minds certain of them have invented
the phrase 'social Darwinism,' and have set it up as a sort of 'man of
straw' in order to show their agility in knocking it down." He protested "in the strongest possible terms against the application of the
term Darwinism to the race struggle." Malthusianism was also
wrongly called Darwinism since "it falls far short of embodying even
the principle of natural selection." When he heard eugenics also being
called "social Darwinism," Ward simply ducked the question of its
appropriateness and got down to criticism of the elitist views which it
masked in the particular case.57
But what of his own charges against "animal economics"? Had
Ward too not created a straw man? Did recent allegations of "social
Darwinism" merely state explicitly what he and others had been doing
for some time"? Ward answered in effect that the difference lay in the
fact that he understood Darwin, and others did not. He insisted that
his suspicions were valid: classical economists were misusing Darwinian phrases to buttress their position. Ward illustrated this misuse by
citing a paraphrase of the laissez-faire argument by the Italian sociologist, Achilles Loria, also a critic of the classical position. ("Men . . .
they say, have carried on a terrible struggle for life.... It is therefore
wrong to deplore the bloody battles between men and the fierce competition which makes them trample upon one another.") "He does not
say who defended this doctrine," Ward continued, "but it cannot be
denied that something near akin to it is held by many biologists ... and
that it is practically the attitude of most scientific men and evolutionists
in so far as they have expressed themselves on the subject." Like Loria,
Ward simply denied their claim to such rhetoric. He had "never yet
seen any distinctly Darwinian principle appealed to in the discussions
of 'social Darwinism'." He then went on to explain, as he had so often
before, how his own teachings harmonized with Darwin's.58
57Ward,"Social and Biological Struggles," 290-93; "Social Darwinism."
58Ward,"Social and Biological Struggles," 291-92.
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Ward's "something near akin" and "practically the attitude," like
similar qualifiers in the writings of the others considered, strongly
suggests that he too was fashioning from his own concerns a portrait
of the opposition that had as little objectivity as the cries of "atheistic
communism" raised at a later time on the other side. Yet the role
played by the idea of "social Darwinism" (and equivalent charges)
would be merely interesting if it did not have further significance in
both the thought of the period, and in its subsequent historiography.
The popularity of the charge among reformers suggests that
certain specifically Darwinian slogans remained highly charged, and
could be absorbed by conservatives only at their peril. Classical economics, Lockean liberalism, a Franklinesque success mythology: each
could be bent, quite without Darwin, to serve the needs of the emerging capitalist order-by abridging Wealth of Nations to omit Adam
Smith's concern for the public good, by debasing the "liberty" of the
Declaration to an uncompromising defense of property, or by forgetting everything Franklin said about character.59 Alternately, a new
Germanic invasion of neo-Kantian and Hegelian philosophy fostered
an Idealism which served similar conservative purposes, and was especially attractive to those who disliked "materialism."60 All contained a significant leaven of Christian sentiment, and in one way or
another posited "natural laws" that would lead to ultimate harmony.
Evolutionism and organic analogies also contributed to the conservative defense, without violating Enlightenment or Idealist fundamentals, by suggesting that change comes slowly, that society is a
complex organism, and that "nature" provided reliable guidelines.61
But Darwinism-with its slogans of "struggle for existence," "natural
selection," and "survival of the fittest"-was a different matter. Suggesting (whatever Darwin's intention) that nature's plan was no plan at
all, Darwinian "nature" presented society a mirror, not of its possibilities, but of its failures. Dedicated to "natural law," defenders of
laissez-faire-even those who appealed generally to "evolution"took little comfort from this development. The few who did not ignore
Darwin, but attempted to incorporate the new terminology,
opened themselves immediately to a barrage of criticism. Of these
few Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner were the leading
examples, and for this reason figured so often in reform indictments.
Yet far from shaping a new consensus, both Spencer and Sumner saw
59The specific references are to Robert G. McCloskey, American Conservatism
(Cambridge, Mass), chs. 4-5; and Louis B. Wright, "Franklin's Legacy to the
Gilded Age," Va. Q. R., XXII (Mar. 1946), 268-79. Ralph H. Gabriel, The Course of
American Democratic Thought (New York, 1940), largely ignores social Darwinism
and stresses the Enlightment and Idealist defenses of property.
60Perry Miller, "Introduction," American Thought Since the Civil War (New
6"Youmans,Sumner, and many others argued in such fashion.
York, 1954).
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their efforts end in futility and failure. Spencer coined "survival of the
fittest" in the mid-1860's precisely to avoid the anti-uniformitarian and
anti-progressive connotations of "natural selection"-and then devoted years to agonizing over whether this law did or did not operate
within civilized society, a debate which in his declining years sapped
his energies and reduced his audience. William Graham Sumner likewise discovered that "survival of the fittest" was a loaded and dangerous phrase, while even the Malthusian "struggle for existence" of man
against nature was translated by critics into a Darwinian law of perpetual social struggle and hence discredited.62
The paucity of bona fide examples of conservative Darwinismboth in the Gilded Age reform literature here considered, and in later
histories-was not due simply to the ignorance of conservatives to
whom the new ideas had not yet filtered down. Rather their silence,
and the tentativeness of the few who attempted to incorporate Darwinian slogans, reflected the not remarkable fact that individuals who
desire stability, consensus, homogeneity, and peaceful change under
a capitalist regime-as did businessmen and many of their middle
class defenders-found little comfort in a cosmology that posited permanent struggle as the engine of progress. When non-Marxist reformers like Lloyd, Bellamy, and Ward accepted such a vision, they
too were anxious to temper its revolutionary aspects. Struggle, all
agreed, was a fact of life, but would henceforth be among "minds"
and "consciences." In Lloyd's version: "There is a struggle for survival among consciences . . . and survival of the fittest." In the Bellamyite: "a mental and moral competition ... in which the law of the

survival of the fittest will have full and unrestrained sway."63
But the reformers also wished to distinguish their neo-liberalism
from the older creed which it challenged. While their spiritual zeal
became the hallmark of progressivism, the same reformers attacked
traditional liberalism by charging that its tenets of individualism,
free enterprise, competition, and laissez-faire were merely bogus
biology. Darwinism, far from buttressing these older virtues, thus
sounded their death knell in a double sense: first in providing an emotionally charged rhetoric to describe the existing order; and second
by the restoration of the older values in a form that discredited their
proponents.
The sincerity and persistence of the stereotype of conservative
62E. g., "The Selfish Sciences," New York Times, March 9, 1883; C. F. Adams,
[letter], ibid., March 18, 1883; "Cornering a Professor," n.p., n.d., (all clippings in
Folio 206, pp. 44-6, Sumner Papers, Yale); A. Jaretski, Index, n.s. VI (Dec. 17, 1885),
294-96; Ward "Mind as a Social Factor," Glimpses, III, 365.
63Lloyd, Notebook [Diary] XXXIX (Nov. 15, 1886); I (ca. 1887), 17, Lloyd
Papers; John S. Cobb, "General Walker and the Atlantic," Nationalist, II (1890),
135-38.
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"Social Darwinism" suggest that its recurrence in reform literature
was no cynical tactic. Industrial America seemed a jungle in which
human purpose and effort played increasingly less role. Some "rugged"
individuals appeared to defend the situation in the name of "science,"
and therefore the "science" in question must be the jungle law of Darwinism. Such logic supposedly made a special appeal to a generation
whose warm embrace of "science" masked a covert fear of its
"logical" implications. So viewed, the conservative "Social Darwinism" stereotype represented an anti-utopian blueprint of a world
guided solely by "scientific" considerations, thus providing a recurring motif in the Anglo-American reaction against "scientism."64
The widespread acceptance of "conservative Darwinism" in the
histories of the 1940's and 1950's65was a final chapter in this same
story. A number of other factors had etched the portrait more deeply
in the intervening decades. Chief among these were (1) a popular identification of Nietzscheanism with Darwinism and militarism before
and during World War I, an association that produced charges not
only of Darwinian militarism but of "individualism" (Nietzsche) and
"elitism" (Junkerdom); (2) the appeal to Darwinism by eugenicists,
a movement that made many reformers uneasy, even when it was infused with the humanitarianism of the progressive period, and that became a national concern when Hitler proposed mass extermination of
the "unfit"; and (3) New Deal debates in which laissez-faire individualism revived, perhaps now bolstered by a genuine conservative Darwinian folk-wisdom such as expressed by one "Middletown" businessman who affirmed "the strongest and best survive-that's the law of
nature after all."66 The fact that George, Ward, and Bellamy seemed
prophets of the New Deal added lustre to their charges. The midcentury historians then found additional evidence in much the same
way the reformers had: by labelling "Darwinistic" all references to
"natural law," "evolution," and even "development,"; and by misconstruing complex methodological debates concerning the value of
"biological analogies."67 The result in the case of "conservative
Darwinism" was distortion and exaggeration that is perhaps better
termed-to borrow from Lester Ward-a "man of straw" set up to be
knocked down. However wrongheaded, Gilded Age conservatives
should be allowed to state their case in their own words.
Swarthmore College.
64For an explicit manipulation of "conservative Darwinism" in connection with
an extended anti-Utopian vision see Ignatius Donnelly, Caesar's Column (John Har65Seenote 2.
vard edn., 1960), 177 ff.
"6An important World War I statement of the Nietzsche-Darwin-Junker connection is George Nasmyth, Social Progress and Darwinian Theory (New York, 1916),
an explication of the views of J. Novikov. The Middletown statement is quoted in
Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, 50.
67Esp.Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, ch. 8.
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